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Abstract
The paper deals with social and political changes of contemporary governance, 
highlighting how they involve practice and theory of law. The pluralization of agencies 
involved in global dynamics breeds a trend to fragmentation of political order granted 
by modern State, revealing how modern legal categories are too narrow to contain today 
normative practices. The idea of institution, thus, could be a quite elastic definition for 
the plurality of practices, historically labeled as law. 
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Resumen
El artículo profundiza en los cambios políticos y sociales de la gobernanza contem-
poránea y pone de manifiesto la manera en que estos envuelven la práctica y la teoría 
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del derecho. La pluralización de los agency comprometidos en las dinámicas globales 
provoca una tendencia a la fragmentación del orden político representado por el Estado 
moderno, y revela que las categorías del derecho moderno son demasiado estrechas 
para contener todas las prácticas normativas actuales. De ahí que la idea de institución 
pudiera ser una definición bastante elástica para enmarcar la pluralidad de prácticas 
históricamente consideradas como derecho. 
Palabras clave 
Ley, norma, gobierno, institución.
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Introduction
In present day the social and political diversification is a massive source of interest-
ing issues for legal scholars. New managerial structures – fixed in gradual levels – and 
supervisory control of behaviour, confronts with governmental stability while provid-
ing a new model of interactions among power, which is increasingly complex and de-
centralized. Clearly, this condition affects the juridical analysis in terms of a profound 
ambivalence, which is brought about through two likely options: how we should repre-
sent law today? 
The primarily attempts to answer the question should be oriented toward a theo-
retical definition which visualizes a broader understanding of the phenomenon. Thus, 
the questions should rather be: what are we meaning by law? What do words like law, 
droit, diritto – and so on – stand for? About the human experience which we regard as 
juridical, how similar these are? Otherwise, when the perspective becomes factual and 
operative, the attention is stressed on the juridical trait of the rules. 
Then, we should ask ourselves: what does the juridical trait convey? By what means 
can we recognize these binding rules (to which we must obey categorically)? How should 
we behave toward them? Act toward them? Or still, by what criteria do we follow, utilize 
or even contradict the rules? How could it be possible to identify the very juridical trait 
across which we come on a daily basis? 
It should be clear by now: a resolution could not be led unless these questions affect 
one another. The idea behind the law modifies its operativeness as much as on the way 
around. In other words, as the law performs differently and, thus, is perceived differently 
so are the categories by which it is conceptualized. 
In the current scenario of a gradual re-balance of stability, resulting in the grinding 
and decentralizing of power we face, anguish as they are, the categories of the modern 
age as opposed to the wide variety of normative practices. After being partially released 
from the influence of state legalism, the law has regained the older poietic trait which 
defined it in premodern experience (Grossi, 2011; 2015). On the other hand, however, it 
is no longer predictable, certain and recognizable as these were guaranteed by the state 
narrative at its best.
In this regard, then, this work is designed into various sections. 
The first one would reconstruct the current social pattern in constant progress, by 
means of recovering that complexity which is presented toward scholars and observers 
of any discipline through the new intersections of power. 
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The following section, indeed, would resume the category of institution – conceived 
by Santi Romano – which is based on the attention to the disparate historical modes of 
the social domain. 
Finally the last section would disassemble the organizational pattern – grounded 
in the institutional theory – into its founding elements: rule, decision and recognition. 
Flows and spaces within the normative realm 
The national dispositif, to Saskia Sassen, is but the assembly of three elements: ter-
ritory, authority and rights. Because of the institutionalizations are complex, subdued 
by duels and appealing dynamics, after extended time and space, they would reassem-
ble themselves in different patterns whose capabilities were distinctly developed one 
by one. Indeed, these thrived by each specific assemblage, have historically allowed the 
access to the sequent framework (Sassen, 2006). The capabilities do not result in bind-
ing consequences, rather they are historically defined by occasions which the author 
has described as turning point. Therefore they come from a progressive nature which 
overlooks the given premises and transforming it unexpectedly. Briefly, the centraliza-
tion of power and authority which is related to the national assemblage did entangle 
with the feudal capacities. And on the other hand, the advanced denationalization 
implies administrative and organizational capacities that States have developed on 
the national age. 
It is then important to understand how such capacities are able to reassemble the 
realm generated by the system of state-nation, and its consequent new framework: the 
denationalization.
How do these capacities reassemble the society described by the nation-state system 
and produce the new framework of the denationalization?
Sassen claims that the flows of capital, labor and information outline new spaces, 
overwriting traditional boundaries of the nation-states. The global cities, for instance, 
play the part of nodes in a cross-border network. That is partially autonomous from the 
internal dynamics of the states to which the individual cities belong. A global city works 
as hubs of coordination and control for high finance and global capital. A large cluster 
of highly specialized services and skilled workers, allows them to exercise functions oth-
erwise unachievable (Sassen, 1994).
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It is important to emphasize at the outset that, according to Sassen, a global city is 
senseless as a single entity: cities can manage global flows only as part of a intertwined 
circuit of metropolises. They are nodes with very similar characteristics and social dy-
namics which, going beyond State borders, produce a denationalized space. In short, 
global cities draw a new geography which is divergent and semi-autonomous from the 
political, social and even legal framework of nation.
We, then, seem to infer that the actors and their activity are of a great importance. 
Their increasing participation redresses the balance of power, in new institutional struc-
tures. The normative production is empowering its relation to private subjects any time 
more, meanwhile these create regulatory instruments to pursue specific needs. This en-
ergetic entity within private subjects – that is applied in producing rules – involves even 
formal and public institutions. In other words, States are increasingly conditioned, in 
their political and administrative legislative – and even judicial – choices, by practices 
and normative and tools set up in private sector. Rating agencies seem to be a clear ex-
ample of such a linkage.
The great proliferation of standard contracts, as well as the arbitration judgement 
– and broadly speaking – the progressive contractualization of relationships, both at 
national and international, made some scholars reflect over a possible return of lex mer-
catoria. (Ferrarese, 2006). This is a specific field of rules, raised in Europe during the 
middle ages by the economic practices of the merchants. It was a trans-territorial nor-
mative regime, unchained to local authorities and body of law. The current market -like 
the one at the time of the middle age- seems to produce a separate and trans-national 
normative field, a boundless law (Ferrarese, 2006; 2012).
As a matter of fact, the rationale of interest comes up alongside, and sometimes 
exceeds, that of the rights. This complex and decentralized framework, produced by 
non-homogeneous authors and through different practices, moves away from the idea 
of government and evokes the idea of governance: a functional order not founded by 
formal legitimacy of a superordinate authority, but by a sharing of goals. According to 
the well-known definition of Rosenau:
[…] governance is not synonymous with government. Both refer to purposive 
behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government suggests 
activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the im-
plementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activi-
ties backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally 
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prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to 
overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more 
encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental insti-
tutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms where-
by those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their 
needs, and fulfil their wants (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 4-5).
However, governance and sovereignty entrain a adaptable relationship with each 
other. This two configurations are opposed but complementary, hinges of a power 
that moves and develops through their continuous inter-relationship. Thus the most 
suitable approach, when referring to these configurations, other than set up these two 
against each other, should detect and reveal the ways in which they are interrelated. 
(Tucci, 2012, p.7).
According to what just said, the hard law, centered on the binary legal / illegal and 
enforced with coercive power, is flanked by a soft law able to direct behaviors, per-
suading more than obliging, dissuading rather than forbidding, convincing more than 
punishing. Contractual means are increasingly preferred to the legislative instrument 
on both the realms of individuals relationships and the public.
In the first case, general clauses and standard contracts – produced by law firms for 
companies – end up regulating a huge number of relationships, often many times larger 
than that regulated by the laws of some States. Their sophisticated structure is the out-
come of a “legal engineering”, and requires the knowledge of private hyper-specialized 
legal workers. Which become then capable of producing regulatory frameworks valid 
for a very large number of subjects, residing in the most disparate regions. Moreover 
they are often adopted by third parties, becoming standard regulatory instruments.
Even at international level, agreements and negotiations become a central pivot in 
weaving interconnection between States and governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations. While ignoring the previous dividing lines (internal / external, national / 
international, public / private), what this boundless law does is, overwriting previous 
delimitations and differences and producing a network in which a supposed absence 
of hierarchies would allow the free participation of interested parties in pursuing their 
specific interests. In short, a structure of equal and reticular relationship characterized 
by the lexicon of interests and absolute freedom.
On the other hand, this structure is not without differences and superordinates: far 
from being a smooth space of equal opportunities, the network of global governance 
SOFT-Taco #10.indd   180 17/01/19   22:50
181
has a very complex stratification, in which differences and possibilities are distributed 
on many levels. Borders do not actually disappear, but rather they are redistributed into 
new assemblages and geographies.
Indeed, the construction of spaces becomes the main node of governance technol-
ogy. In this sense, even the modern category of citizenship, with its burden of universal 
image, is parceled out into specific subjectivities, which is the outcome of intersecting 
sovereignty, governmentality and discipline. This technology aims at producing suit-
able individuals for fulfilling the specific needs of neoliberal logic. Even though this 
discourse can be applied to every latitude, yet it appears particularly evident in some 
regions of the planet.
By means of analyzing the conditions of workers in the Southern East of Asia, Aiwha 
Ong clarifies the functioning of this government technology. The concept of exception 
which Carl Schmitt placed at the origin of modern sovereignty (Schmitt, 1932) retains 
here a central role. However, in its traditional understanding exception was caught in its 
liminal space, as the pillar of political-juridical order because it was inferred as a foun-
dational moment. But Ong identifies its productive presence constantly at work within 
the social organization, as a complex political device.
In its neo-liberal form, exception assumes a dual role: neoliberalism as an exception 
and exception to neoliberalism. The first one is an application of economic calcula-
tions in the management of populations and social spaces: by suspending democratic 
practices the neoliberal exception legitimizes political choices claiming their technical 
requirements. As a matter of fact, these decisions are removed from political discourse. 
Vice versa, exceptions to neoliberalism can be invoked to create separate institution-
al enclosures in order to exclude certain populations which are often subjected to fero-
ciously repressive sovereignty, these spaces still function within the economic rationale.
Even though these spaces serve the market, they exist outside the market. This cri-
teria/dynamics, operates in both sense: it is as much an incremental device as a repres-
sive one. For instance, exceptions to neoliberalism can debar part of a population from 
welfare, or instead it can guarantee exclusive protections and benefit. The neoliberal 
exception operates inside and across national boundaries, disjointing citizenship, to re-
assemble its component in specialized memberships.
This governmental device uses individual needs to produce ‘docile bodies’, steering 
populations to additional forms of life, or rather disciplining it through law enforce-
ment. Citizens of same Country are submitted to different law regimes: even if citi-
zenship formally don’t disappear then, it is disassembled in a number of different and 
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temporary subjectivations. Citizenship still exists, but ever more as void form than a 
functional tool, overstretched by the actual set of right, bonds and memberships, born 
from what Ong calls sovereignty by intersection: an articulated framework in which 
companies, government and ONG lead the assembling of spaces and regimes. Special 
economic zones (SEZ) and special administrative regions (SAR), for instance, where 
Chinese government consolidates specific and different labor conditions, investments 
opportunity and markets. 
Sovereignty then still exists, but as a part of this new framework it is a key for 
producing post development geography., created as a consequence of neoliberalism 
(Ong, 2006).
Whit Buddha is Hiding Ong (2003) had already highlighted, using Foucault’s catego-
ries of Homo oeconomicus (Foucault 2004b) and governmentality, the practices processes 
of subjectivation / subjection to which Cambodian refugees in North America are sub-
jected for acquiring citizenship. While refugees bend to a network of offices, welfare, vo-
cational schools, hospitals and workplaces they reinvent it, building their own subjectivity 
as the result of a non-frontal resistance to a normative power. Subjectivity, in other words, 
is not played on an antithesis, but distributed, fragmented and constantly acted on the 
whole plan of social practice. The conscious assumption of the legal context of rights and 
obligations, implements a set of practices aimed at avoiding discipline. Nonetheless the 
disciplinary norm is recognized, adopted and bent to specific needs. Everything is played 
around the norm, through its use and its constant readjustment. Hence, norm is no more 
than an imposing device, which ‘cuts’ macro groups, creating stable memberships. Rather, 
it produces articulated, unstable and functionalized differences.
The sovereign does not disappear. Indeed, as we have seen, it is a fundamental ele-
ment in neoliberal dynamics. Its presence, however, assumes unusual connotations, or 
hardly recognizable in the full modern experience: it is graduated.
According to Ong, graduated sovereignty is, the flexible administration of sovereign 
power, due to the modulation, by governments, of political spaces in behalf of the needs 
of global capital (Ong, 2006). These articulated framework rises from a combination of 
disciplinary, regulatory and pastoral devices, combined in relation to the needs of mar-
ket. Unprofessional workers and migrants are governed through disciplinary techniques 
in productive areas, with the aim of “promoting both productivity and political stabil-
ity, thus creating suitable conditions to global manufacturing. At the same time, highly 
skilled foreign workers and members of dominant ethnic elites, in different regions, are 
regulated in a lighter way, through a pastoral care (Foucault, 2004a; 2004b)
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Two meanings of norm, thus coexists in this framework: from one hand norm is 
here a behavioural normalization, according to Foucault’s theories; on the other hand 
norm can still be read, in the typical contest of legal language, as normativity, i.e. a bi-
nary criterion of the permit / forbidden.
Normalization is accompanied by the proliferation of legislative activity, which is 
demonstrated by the anthropological studies of Ong, and allows this standardization. 
The normative language is ramified, finding in the effectiveness a new effervescence. Ac-
cording to Cassese “le metamorfosi del diritto non vanno nel senso della sua fine, bensì 
in direzione opposta” (Cassese, 2009, p. 29). 
However, this widespread and productive distribution and sharing of normative 
power, and the resulting organizational polymorphism, are not unusual in the history 
of law. Among others, Paolo Grossi reconstructs the complexity of medieval experience 
as coexistence and mutual interdependence of legal systems of different inspiration and 
structure. During this period the development of law in European political and social 
space has continuously produced disparate institutional forms, in a highly articulated 
overlap and interdependence: from iura propria, developed in the early centuries by 
notaries and local scholars, to ius commune of the most mature eras, born in the cradles 
of the universities and developed as a dialogue between learned and refined scholars; 
from the ius usus foeudorum to lex mercatoria, a specific right arising from the commer-
cial practice (Grossi, 2011). The medieval epoch shows how the juridical categories of 
modernity – mythologies, as Grossi calls them (Grossi, 2007; Romano, 1947) –, born 
from the monolithic and vertical structure of the State eidos, are too narrow to contain 
the actual phenomenon of law. Faced with the contemporary development mentioned 
here, Grossi speaks about a “return to law” (Grossi, 2015), meaning a restored creativity 
of law, a new trend to innovative tools and solutions to social problems.
The concept of Institution
Grossi suggests that Santi Romano’s institutionalism is a doable analytical key to 
these diachronic and synchronic polymorphism. Indeed, Romano’s consideration rose 
during the first half of the last century, in another time of crisis for the modern State, as 
we shall define it (Romano, 1910). The author was able to detect those years events with 
realistic attitude and accuracy, as Alfonso Catania wrote (Catania, 2006, p. 117). Facing 
these realistic view, the smooth body of the nation progressively returns to his complexity. 
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Therefore the value of these approach is, above all, methodological, and lies in the dis-
positions to detect positive developments, looking at the present without ideological or 
theoretical preconception. 
According to Capograssi, this is a method based on pure observation and inventory 
(Capograssi, 1959), in the social domain the fact of law is visible as social order: ubi so-
cietas, ibi ius, and ubi ius, ibi societas (Romano, 1917, p. 26). The attention is particularly 
paid to the juridical reality in its complex, and this actuality unties the bound between 
law and sovereignty. With the words of the author: 
Hanno torto e ragione nel medesimo tempo coloro che credono la sovranità requi-
sito essenziale dello Stato e quelli che ammettono l’esistenza di Stati non sovrani: ambe-
due queste proposizioni sono vere, ma come soluzioni di distinti problemi, ciascuno dei 
quali è a porsi per un dato ordinamento. E per l’ordinamento statale, lo Stato è sempre 
sovrano (Romano, 1946, p. 71).
The sovereignity is revealed as the main characteristic of a specific kind of law: the 
paradigm of sovereign state, not of Law in general. The capability to express a single will 
and the possibility to resemble a strongly centralized power – able to conform to the 
common good – result in a contingent outcome of a very specific type of configuration. 
The sovereign law is a configuration historically given, made by fine and magnificent 
juridical devices (Romano, 1910). 
The primary issue still demands to comprehend this organized unity, finding the 
source of its order. Indeed, once rejecting both norm and decision, the fact of institutional 
order leans on nothing. In light of said condition, by providing the concept of ius invo-
lontarium Romano attempts to create distance between norm and organization, and to 
disable the element of decision. Despite his endeavour, he offers, instead, a purely negative 
definition: trough the ius involontarium we are only aware of what law is not: will. 
Once more, Capograssi is of avail in detecting the series of issues left behind by the 
previous approach: 
L’organizzazione, certo. Ma come e perché l’organizzazione dura, e dura anche qui 
non come mero fatto, ma pretende di durare, s’impone come necessità di durare, si im-
pone perfino, si osa dire, a coloro che l’hanno promossa, trascende per così dire i suoi 
autori? Che strana realtà è insomma questa che non solo c’è, ma pretende di esserci, pre-
tende di essere rispettata, di non essere violata, di imporsi come una necessità superiore 
alle mobili volontà dei soggetti? (Capograssi, 1959, p. 250).
Organization as an empirical and observable fact indeed, represent for Capograssi 
an amazing intuition: in the depth of reality lies something that is both law and the 
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source of law: “[…] che è diritto e da cui nasce il diritto” (Capograssi, 1959, p. 250). Still, 
this intuition is not suitable enough to solve the enigma of juridical order. Rather, by 
demanding great focus on the fact, issues are multiplied: what is this order? How does 
the fact -in its immediate disorder- become order?
Due to its being an analytical tool, order unbound the investigation from the need 
to detect a punctual origin of law. On the other hand, the aftermath neutralizes any in-
stitutional process. Therefore the institution transmutes in an ever-given order and, in 
this irenic view, law appears just as an assumed fact. 
Romano’s institunialism has the avail of redirecting the attention towards those as-
pects which underlines the contiguity between norms and citizens/actors, opening the 
label law to a cluster of social experiences, which would be otherwise hard to define 
(Catania, 2006; 2008). This explanation involves massive costs, neglecting in the end 
the basic ambivalence of juridical law, which is simultaneously endurance/stable and 
movement, agency and goal. 
According to Bobbio, it is still trusty that plurality is a condicio sine qua non for 
conflict (Bobbio, 2007, p. 153); but in Romano’s institutionalism conflict remains be-
tween institutions, or rather is exiled, as an hypothesis or a risk to avoid. No tenseness 
is registered inside institutions. The conflict which crosses the order –allowing it – is 
simply neglected. Due to this, Romano is able to reduce the role of norms, designing 
them as system’s chess-pawns (Romano, 1917): by ignoring the Polemos that lies in the 
main core of institutional order, norm can be easily hidden by the mere fact of or-
ganization. Indeed, the word institution in Romano’s conceptualization an unsolved 
ambiguity:
Per un verso la parola chiave organizzazione non viene mai chiaramente definita; 
ora il diritto viene definito come ‘organizzazione’, cioè risolto totalmente in un’altra en-
tità, […] ora l’organizzazione viene considerata come ‘lo scopo caratteristico del diritto’. 
Ma se l’organizzazione non è il diritto ma lo scopo del diritto, che cosa è allora il diritto? 
(Bobbio, 2007, p. 147).
Conflict can’t be ignored, if we want a complete understanding of the actual func-
tioning on institutional fact. Indeed, it has to be considered as a structural element of 
juridical order. 
In conclusion, if it is true that the Law can be empirically detected as a firm insti-
tution – by Romano’s assertion –, we cannot interrupt the analysis based on the outer 
framework of the give fact. The tie between order and law is not a plain element, but 
a composite structure; an outcome rather than a pure essence. The fact of law is not 
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given, but a dynamic and contingent outcome which is made by a complex set of 
agencies, actors and proceedings. 
Conclusions
The word institution itself preserves an internal ambivalence, meaning at the same 
time both a proceeding (to institute) and an outcome (instituted order). It reminds 
to a visible fact - the given organization - and yet is a perpetual work in progress: 
it is both a framework for individual actions, and an ever transactional outcome, 
produced by those actions. Both sides are united in a continuum of dynamism and 
durability. 
That is why the element of will spans and sustains the entire juridical system (Cata-
nia, 2008). Indeed, law does not simply confer power, but it is founded on power confer-
ring. Obviously, the sense of this powers is all within the juridical framework: a juridical 
power is the possibility to change the framework (the law) in which the actors play. 
The void of will – suggested by ius involontarium – is conceivable as long as we 
mean it as the undetectability of decision, for it is melted in the entire institution, at 
any level: ius could be described as involontarium only if we mean it is impossible (or at 
least unsatisfactory) to identify an exclusive source of decision. I.e. if with it we mean a 
departure from the modern claim, reductio ad unum. 
Through its being a human fact – i.e. an artificial creation – the institutional order 
is indeed deeply tied to voluntary actions. The will is thus the agent of development of 
institutional life, and its existence could be understood as an obliquus presence within 
the entire juridical order. 
That is why Hart’s theory should be read as an hypothetical reply to institution-
alism weaknesses (Bobbio, 2007). Hart’s secondary legal rules can explain the fact of 
organization, linking it to agencies and actor’s choices. The actual functioning of this 
poietic power relies on a communicative tool: the norm. Decision can’t be a solipsistic 
element, it makes sense – is effective – only in a public domain. It must be expressed in 
a knowable – and so formalized – way. For the purpose to leave the absolute individual 
domain, actions and decisions ought to be communicated and received. Norm is hence 
the formal element required by law, the crystallization of a will which guarantees its ef-
fectiveness. Only through this formalization, decisions could become criteria for future 
behaviors, producing any institutional framework. 
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